This paper investigates how concern for the environment translates into predictable patterns of consumer behavior. Two types of behavior are considered. First, individuals who care about environmental quality may voluntarily restrain their consumption of goods and services that generate a negative externality. Second, individuals may choose to pay a price premium for goods and services that are more environmentally benign. A theoretical model identifies a symmetry between such voluntary restraint and a voluntary price premium that mirrors the symmetry between environmental policies based on either quantities (quotas) or prices (taxes). We test predictions of the model in an empirical study of household electricity consumption with introduction of a price-premium, green-electricity program. We find evidence of voluntary restraint and its relation to a voluntary price premium. The empirical results are consistent with the theoretical model of voluntary conservation.
Introduction
A primary focus of environmental economics is the design of policy instruments that induce agents to internalize environmental externalities. This paper, in contrast, examines the extent to which consumers internalize their externalities voluntarily, i.e., through conservation that arises without policy interventions. With a combination of theoretical and empirical methods, we consider whether people actually exhibit voluntary conservation, to what extent, and why.
A theoretical model of consumer behavior is used to show the relationship between two potential types of voluntary conservation. The …rst is that consumers who care about environmental quality may demand less of a good that causes a negative externality. The second is that consumers may choose to pay a premium for goods and services that are more "environmentally friendly."We refer to these behaviors as voluntary restraint and a voluntary price premium, respectively. The model generates a series of predictions about the relationship between demand under voluntary restraint and demand with a voluntary price premium. We test the model's predictions in an empirical study of household demand for electricity.
The data come from Traverse City, Michigan, and the study period spans the date when the local public utility initiated a voluntary, premium-priced, green-electricity program to reduce air pollution emissions. 1 The empirical setting-which includes panel data on monthly household electricity consumption that we combine with an original household survey-provides a unique opportunity to investigate conservation as it relates to voluntary restraint of conventional electricity and a voluntary price premium for green electricity.
Prior research has investigated various empirical aspects of voluntary restraint in the context of energy consumption. 2 A few studies have analyzed whether appeals for conservation following the energy crisis of 1973 had an e¤ect on household energy use. Peck and Doering (1976) study household demand for heating fuel and …nd no signi…cant e¤ect of a conservation campaign aimed at changing residential fuel-use patterns. Walker (1980) reviews several of these studies and provides 1 "Green"electricity is electricity generated from renewable sources of energy, including wind, solar, and geothermal energy. Most conventional electricity in the United States is generated from coal, which produces several air pollutants as by-products (e.g., CO, CO2 , NOx , SO2 , particulates, lead, and mercury). 2 A substantial literature investigates utility-sponsored voluntary programs for energy conservation, such as timeof-use rates and home energy audits. The primary reason to enroll in such programs is to reduce energy expenditures.
Here we consider conservation that is motivated only for non-pecuniary reasons. evidence that the energy crisis stimulated conservation beyond that which can be explained by changes in price or income. Estimates of the conservation e¤ect range from 4 percent for electricity to 10 percent for natural gas. Lee (1981) …nds a similar result, with estimates ranging from 1 to 4 percent, for conservation of electricity due to a public relations campaign in the mid-1970s. More recently, Reiss and White (2005) investigate the e¤ect of public appeals for conservation related to the California energy crisis in 2000-2001. They …nd that, absent any economic incentives to do so, households reduced their electricity consumption by 6 percent for extended durations following a conservation campaign.
There is also a recent empirical literature that investigates willingness to pay a voluntary price premium for green electricity. Many of these studies employ stated-or revealed-preference techniques to derive estimates of willingness to pay for various types of green electricity (e.g., Goett, et al., 2000; Champ and Bishop, 2001; Roe, et al., 2001) . Other studies analyze factors that in ‡uence participation in a particular green-electricity program (e.g., Oberholzer-Gee, 2001; Rose, et al., 2002; Kotchen and Moore, 2007) . In general, this literature …nds that many households state a willingness to pay a premium for green electricity, yet actual participation depends on the program structure, household characteristics, attitudes related to the environment, and the existence of "warm-glow" motives. 3 This paper makes several contributions to the literature. The theoretical model is the …rst to examine the relationship between voluntary restraint and a voluntary price premium. The model generates a series of new predictions that relate conservation based on quantities to conservation based on prices. Underlying the model is a symmetry between environmental policies based on either quantities (quotas) or prices (taxes). The empirical analysis is based on revealed preferences rather than stated preferences, and it takes advantage of a natural experiment in which participants in the green electricity program are compared with a control group of households on the program's waiting list. The paper also goes beyond identifying di¤erences between participants and nonparticipants; for the …rst time, questions are addressed about di¤erences in electricity consumption before and after participation. 4 We …nd evidence of voluntary restraint and its relation to a voluntary price premium. The empirical results are consistent with the theoretical model of voluntary conservation.
Theoretical Model
An extensive psychology literature on voluntary conservation is based on a model developed by Schwartz (1970 Schwartz ( , 1977 concerning the activation of norms for altruistic behavior. According to the model, activation of these norms depends critically on the presence of two personal beliefs: awareness that harmful consequences may come to others from inaction, and ascription of responsibility to oneself for those consequences. Individuals who possess these beliefs consider it their duty to behave altruistically; otherwise they experience a feeling of guilt from shirking their responsibility.
Psychologists have used the Schwartz model to investigate conservation as it relates to electricity consumption (e.g., Black, Stern and Elworth, 1985) . In this context, the necessary beliefs to motivate conservation are interpreted as awareness of pollution that arises from generating conventional electricity, and ascription of personal responsibility for some of the social costs. Because studies have repeatedly documented the importance of these beliefs for motivating household energy conservation (see Stern, 1992) , the insights of the Schwartz model provide a reasonable starting point for developing an economic perspective.
Our model is based on the simplest setup capable of illustrating the relevant issues of voluntary conservation in the context of electricity consumption. We consider two types of households:
conservationists and nonconservationists, where only conservationists satisfy the necessary conditions of Schwartz's norm-activation model. Assume initially that only conventional electricity is available. Households seek to maximize a utility function of the form
where x i is a numeraire consumption good, y i is conventional electricity, and i is an indicator variable such that i = 1 if household i is a conservationist type, and i = 0 if household i is a nonconservationist type. 5 All functions map into R 1 + , all …rst derivatives are strictly positive, and the second derivatives satisfy l 00 0, f 00 < 0, and h 00 0. This setup implies that, relative to nonconservationists, conservationists care about a negative aspect of their conventional-electricity consumption. Although there are several possibilities, we assume this is related to a pollution externality, which causes conservationists to experience guilt from consuming conventional electricity. The functional form of h (y i ) implies that conservationists feel strictly guiltier (at a weakly increasing rate) when they consume more conventional electricity. To ensure that conservationists do consume some electricity, we assume that f 0 (y i ) h 0 (y i ) > 0 over the feasible range of y i .
Each household is endowed with exogenous income m, which, for simplicity here in the theoretical model, we assume is the same for all households. Conventional electricity is available at a constant price p. 6 Thus, households face the budget constraint x i + py i m. Assuming interior solutions (here and throughout), the …rst-order condition that implicitly de…nes each household's demand for conventional electricityŷ i can be written as
For all households, the left hand side is the marginal bene…t of consuming conventional electricity, and the right hand side is the marginal cost. Note that for conservationists the marginal cost includes guilt as well foregone consumption of the numeraire.
Lettingŷ 1 andŷ 0 denote conventional electricity demand for conservationists and nonconservationists, respectively, it follows from (1) thatŷ 1 <ŷ 0 . This illustrates the notion of voluntary restraint: the guilt from generating pollution causes conservationists to restrain their consumption of conventional electricity. We thus have the …rst testable hypothesis of the model.
Proposition 1 Conservationist households will consume less conventional electricity than nonconservationist households.
Now assume green electricity becomes available. Assume further that households can participate in the green-electricity program only if they volunteer to pay a …xed premium of > 0 per unit 5 Additive separability of xi and yi is only a simplifying assumption and does not a¤ect any of our results. 6 We …rst develop the model with a constant price per unit of electricity. We then show that the results generalize to situations with increasing block-rate schedules, which are common for electricity. of electricity consumption, for all of their electricity consumption. The price of green electricity is therefore p g = + p. Green electricity and conventional electricity are perfect substitutes in all respects other than the fact that green electricity does not generate pollution. As a result, conservationists have no reason to feel guilty if they consume green electricity; that is, h (y g i ) = 0 for any level of green electricity y g i . It follows that, depending on the magnitude of , conservationist households may choose to participate in the green-electricity program in order to avoid the guilt of generating pollution through their consumption of conventional electricity.
Other factors may also prompt a household to participate in the green-electricity program.
Many programs, including the one studied in this paper, o¤er decals for the home and car to signal participation, along with newsletters about program and participant updates. Social bene…ts that are unrelated to electricity consumption may therefore motivate participation; the range of possibilities includes social approval, prestige, and signaling about household income. 7 Psychological bene…ts, which are similarly unrelated to electricity consumption, may also play a role, as participation can be associated with the "purchase of moral satisfaction" (Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992) or a feeling of "warm glow" (Andreoni, 1990) . 8
To capture the possibility for these social and psychological bene…ts, we assume that, conditional on participation, a household of either type enjoys a lump-sum bene…t k i 0, which may di¤er among households. The lump-sum bene…t implies that even nonconservationists may have a reason to participate.
The decision of whether to participate in the green-electricity program depends on a comparison of two potential levels of utility. These levels can be written as
The importance of social bene…ts of this type has been examined in the literature on private provision of public goods. For examples see Hollander (1990) , Glazer and Konrad (1996 ), Harbaugh (1998a , 1998b , and Rege and Telle (2004) . 8 In a study of contributions to a green-electricity program in Switzerland, Oberholzer-Gee (2001) …nds empirical support for such psychological bene…ts. He concludes that "The warm-glow part of the motivation to contribute appears to be independent of the value of the public good in the sense that individuals participate in the program even if they do not believe that their use of solar energy will improve the quality of the environment. For these individuals, it is su¢ cient that they contribute to a cause which they believe to be important" (p. 433). and V g (p g ; m; k i ) max
It follows that a household will choose to participate in the green-electricity program only if
But what does participation imply about the existence of guilt from consumption of conventional electricity and the lump-sum bene…t from participation? How will participation a¤ect the quantity of electricity consumption? And what di¤erences in consumption will occur between participating conservationists and nonconservationists? We now turn to these questions.
We …rst consider nonconservationists households. Nonconservationists clearly must enjoy a lump-sum bene…t if they participate in the green-electricity program. Unless k i is positive, nonconservationists have no incentive to pay the price premium for green electricity, as there is no guilt to alleviate and utility is decreasing in the price of electricity. A further result follows from the fact that, for nonconservationists, k i a¤ects participation, but not the marginal decision about the quantity demanded of electricity. A nonconservationist's demand for green electricity is determined by the …rst order condition
which is the same as (1) except for the di¤erence in price. This implies that a nonconservationist's behavioral response to participation in the green-electricity program will be as if there had been an exogenous increase in the price of conventional electricity equal to the premium .
The following proposition summarizes the results for nonconservationists.
Proposition 2 If a nonconservationist household participates in the green-electricity program, then: (a) the household must enjoy a lump-sum bene…t from participation; and (b) after participating, the household's electricity consumption will decline by as much as it would if there had been an increase in the price of conventional electricity equal to the premium for green electricity.
9 In another paper we motivate participation in such a green-electricity program as private provision of an impure public good (Kotchen and Moore, 2007) . The model developed here can be viewed in this way as well, with green electricity producing the joint products of electricity consumption and guilt alleviation. The di¤erence is that, with voluntary conservation, we would expect behavioral evidence of preferences even before the option for green electricity becomes available. As we will see, investigating such evidence, along with before and after comparisons of electricity demand, is the primary focus of the present paper. g y 1 ) (
Figure 1: A conservationist's electricity consumption can increase or decrease
Now consider conservationist households. It turns out that if the price of green electricity is su¢ ciently high, the necessary condition for participation is similar to that for nonconservationists.
To see this, assume is large enough so that the marginal cost curve of consuming green electricity lies above the marginal cost curve of consuming conventional electricity. Figure 1 provides an illustration with the price of green electricity p g . In this case, a participating conservationist will reduce electricity consumption fromŷ 1 to y g 1 . Yet because there is a loss in surplus equal to the shaded area, participation requires an o¤setting lump-sum bene…t. Thus, even conservationists may require a su¢ ciently large lump-sum bene…t in order to participate in the green-electricity program.
In fact, it is straightforward to show that whenever a participating conservationist reduces electricity consumption, it must be the case that k i > 0. 10 More generally, conservationists di¤er from nonconservationists because their electricity consumption need not fall after participating in the green-electricity program, and participation does not require a lump-sum bene…t. Figure 1 provides an illustration with a lower price of green electricityp g (such that p g >p g > p). In this case, electricity consumption increases fromŷ 1 toỹ g 1 , and participation occurs even if k i = 0. Note that, in this case, households choose to pay a higher 1 0 This follows because the assumption that h 00 (yi) 0 implies that ifŷ g 1 <ŷ1, there must be a loss in surplus, as the marginal cost for conventional electricity is lower than for green electricity for all yi <ŷ1. Thus, to o¤set the loss in surplus, participation requires a su¢ ciently large ki > 0.
price for electricity and then consume more. In order to understand this somewhat counterintuitive possibility of a increase in consumption, the important comparison is between the marginal guilt from consumption of conventional electricity atŷ i and the increased marginal cost from the price premium of green electricity atŷ i . If the former is greater than (less than) the latter, then electricity consumption will increase (decrease). 11
It is interesting to note that this relationship mirrors the symmetry between traditional environmental policies based on quantities and prices. For any good or service associated with an externality, a quota can be used to implement the e¢ cient (or any other restrictive) quantity, or a particular Pigouvian tax can be used to accomplish the same objective. Yet, for a given quota, a su¢ ciently high (low) tax will implement a smaller (greater) equilibrium quantity. The relationship here is similar in that households voluntarily internalize a subjective externality and choose their quantity of voluntary restraint, which is consistent with a particular green price premium.
But, conditional on participation, if the price premium is su¢ ciently high (low), then electricity consumption will decrease (increase).
The next proposition summarizes the results for conservationists.
Proposition 3 If a conservationist household participates in the green-electricity program, then:
(a) the household's electricity consumption can increase, decrease, or remain the same, and (b) if consumption decreases, the household must enjoy a lump-sum bene…t from participation.
The model generates further predictions about similarities and di¤erences between conservationists and nonconservationists conditional on participation. Because participating conservationists have no incentive to voluntarily restrain their consumption of green electricity, they should be indistinguishable from participating nonconservationists in terms of their demand for green electricity.
Moreover, because only conservationists were exhibiting voluntary restraint before participating, the model also predicts that they will reduce their consumption by less (if at all) than nonconservationists. These results are summarized in the …nal proposition.
Proposition 4 If both conservationists and nonconservationists participate in the green-electricity program, then: (a) households of both types will consume the same amount of green electricity, and (b) conservationists will reduce their electricity consumption by less (if at all) than nonconservationists.
Thus far we have assumed a constant per-unit price of electricity. Yet residential electricity pricing is often structured with an increasing block-rate schedule. It is, however, straightforward to verify that the main results hold even with a increasing block-rate. Consider a two-tiered rate structure, where the price of conventional electricity is
where p < p and y is the quantity threshold between rates. 12 If we continue to assume a constant premium for green electricity, we can modify the preceding analysis to account for the block rate.
The only di¤erence is that all marginal cost curves have a discontinuity at y i = y ; they all shift up by at least p p for y i > y . With such a modi…cation to the the …rst order conditions, it is straightforward to see that only two results change slightly: the voluntary restraint of Proposition 1 holds with a weak (rather than strict) inequality, and the second part of Proposition 4 holds weakly (rather than strictly) as well. Both of these changes occur because of the possibility that demand is exactly at the threshold between block rates.
Empirical Setting and Data Collection
We test predictions of the theoretical model in an empirical study of demand for electricity, before and after introduction of a green-electricity program in Traverse City, Michigan. The municipal utility, Traverse City Light and Power (TCL&P), provides electricity to approximately 7,000 residential households. In 1994, TCL&P began soliciting households to voluntarily …nance a centralized wind turbine that would generate electricity and replace generation at the local coal-…red power plant. TCL&P completed construction of the turbine and began operating the "Green Rate" pro-gram in June 1996. 13 To participate in the program, households are required to make a three-year commitment to purchase all of their electricity at a price premium of 1.58 cents per kilowatt-hour.
This translates into an average residential premium of $8.50 per month, or a 25-percent increase in the average household's electricity bill. We now describe the data along with the empirical strategy of using membership in an environmental organization to classify households as either conservationists or nonconservationists.
Survey Data
We developed and administered a mail survey of TCL&P residential customers. The existence of a waitlist for the Green Rate program is an important feature of the data because it creates a natural experiment in which to analyze the e¤ect of participation. Households choose whether to participate in the program, but from the very beginning the program was oversubscribed relative to the wind turbine's capacity. While households were admitted to the program on a …rst-come …rst-serve basis, the waitlist was created immediately at the outset. Subsequently, a small number of households have been removed from the waitlist to become participants only when another household withdrew from the program. With respect to participants and waitlisters, 1 3 At the time of construction, the wind turbine was the largest operating in the United States. It produces about 800,000 kilowatt-hours of electricity per year, which can meet the needs of approximately 125 households.
1 4 Copies of the survey instrument are available from the authors upon request. 1 5 We use data from this survey in another study to compare participation decisions in di¤erent green-electricity programs (Kotchen and Moore, 2007) . Here the analysis di¤ers because we combine the survey data with panel data on household electricity demand. As we will show, this enables the empirical investigation of electricity consumption between di¤erent types of households, before and after participation in the green-electricity program.
it is reasonable to treat actual participation as e¤ectively random, and we take advantage of this exogeneity in the empirical analysis. Table 1 compares descriptive statistics for the key survey variables among participants, waitlisters, and nonparticipants. As one might expect, given the discussion above, there are no signi…cant di¤erences between participants and waitlisters. Nonparticipants, however, di¤er from participants and waitlisters with respect to several variables. On average, nonparticipants have an annual household income that is about $10,000 lower, are four years older, have two fewer years of education, and are 30 percent less likely to be a self-reported member of an environmental organization. 16 In addition to the t-test results reported in Table 1 , we conducted Mann-Whitney U tests to assess whether the di¤erent groups of observations come from the same distribution. These non-parametric tests produce very similar results, with the exception of statistically insigni…cant di¤erences in kWhDay in column (5) and Age in column (6).
Utility Data
TCL&P began keeping electronic records of household billing cycles in 1994. Data on electricity consumption for each billing cycle were obtained from January 1994 through May 2002, for a total of 101 months. From these data, we calculated average daily electricity consumption by month for each household in the survey sample. 17 The last row of Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for this variable (kW hDay) for participants, waitlisters, and nonparticipants. While the means for all three groups fall between 16 and 18 kilowatt-hours per day (kWh/day), nonparticipants consume signi…cantly more electricity than participants.
The TCL&P data also includes monthly information on residential rate schedules for each household. The basic residential rate is an increasing block-rate schedule. 18 Four adjustments to this basic rate are then possible. The senior citizen rate (Senior ) charges block rates that start lower 1 6 Surveys were addressed speci…cally to the household member whose name appeared on monthly billing statements for electricity. The fact that Traverse City is somewhat of a retirement community is re ‡ected in the relatively high mean age.
1 7 Characterizing electricity consumption in this way accounts for the di¤erent number of billing days within billing cycles.
1 8 This rate charges 6.33c //kWh for the …rst 16 kWh/day, 7.31c //kWh for the next 17 kWh/day, and 8.2c //kWh for all consumption over 33 kWh/day. 
Classifying Conservationists and Nonconservationists
Testing predictions of the theoretical model requires classifying households as either conservationists or nonconservationists. While identifying underlying preferences poses an inherent empirical challenge, we use self-reported membership in an environmental organization to classify conservationists. In particular, we use the variable Conserv, which is a dummy variable based on belonging to an environmental organization other than participation in the Green Rate program. 21 One advantage of this strategy is its consistency with the psychological basis of the model. Recall the underlying distinction between conservationists and nonconservationists: only conservationists are aware of environmental problems that arise through generation of conventional electricity and are willing to take personal responsibility for addressing the problems. While membership in an environmental organization is likely to apply to environmental concerns more generally, it is a reasonable indicator of knowledge about environmental problems and willingness to take personal responsibility.
But how is membership in an environmental organization related to speci…c preferences about conservation of electricity? This question is important for our analysis, and part of the survey was designed to provide an answer. conducted Mann-Whitney U tests to assess whether the di¤erent groups of observations come from the same distribution, and the results for statistically signi…cant di¤erences were the same as those reported in Table 2 for t-tests.
We also compared responses to these same questions within the subsamples of only participants or nonparticipants in the Green Rate program. This approach controls for program participation and allows us to isolate di¤erences that are due only to Conserv. The results for both participants and nonparticipants follow the same pattern as those in Table 2 , so we do not report them separately.
These results provide evidence that the classi…cation as either conservationist or nonconservationist is distinct from participant or nonparticipant. In other words, "participating nonconservationists"
are not misclassi…ed conservationists, and "nonparticipating conservationists"are not misclassi…ed nonconservationists.
In sum, the di¤erences in responses summarized in Table 2 provide support for using membership in an environmental organization as a proxy variable to classify households as conservationists or nonconservationists with respect to electricity consumption. Interestingly, part of the analysis evaluates whether the stated preferences related to electricity consumption correspond with revealed preferences that actually a¤ect electricity consumption.
Econometric Speci…cation and Estimation
The predictions of the theoretical model relate to di¤erences in electricity consumption along two dimensions: between conservationists and nonconservationists, and before and after participation in the Green Rate program. In this section we describe our empirical strategies for testing these predictions.
We employ a di¤erence-in-di¤erences methodology and estimate regression models of the general form
where i indexes households, t indexes time periods, GrnRate it is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the household is participating in the Green Rate program and 0 otherwise, and X it is a row vector of other explanatory variables (income, the other rate-class schedules, and household characteristics).
The key parameters for testing the theoretical propositions are ', , and , which are interpreted as follows: ' estimates the average di¤erence in conventional -electricity consumption between conservationists and nonconservationists; estimates nonconservationists'average change in electricity consumption after participating in the green-electricity program; and estimates the average difference between conservationists'and nonconservationists'change in electricity consumption after participating in the green-electricity program. Two linear combinations of these parameters are also of interest: + estimates conservationists' average change in electricity consumption after participating in the green-electricity program; and ' + estimates the average di¤erence in green-electricity consumption between participating conservationists and participating nonconservationists.
The coe¢ cients in equation (3) are estimated several ways. We …rst use a random e¤ects model that includes all of the observations (participants, waitlisters, and nonparticipants). The primary advantage of the random e¤ects model is that it enables identi…cation of the coe¢ cient on Conserv i , which is a time-invariant. Yet, to ensure consistency of the random e¤ects estimator, we need to assume that the unobserved e¤ect v i is uncorrelated with the observed explanatory variables (see Wooldridge, 2002) . To test whether this assumption is reasonable, we also estimate a …xed e¤ects model for purposes of comparison.
The random e¤ects estimates are reported as the Full Sample model in Table 3 and is not statistically signi…cant at any reasonable level of con…dence.
We report two sets of standard errors. Bertrand, Du ‡o, and Mullainathan (2004) demonstrate how failure to account for potential serial correlation in di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation results in underestimates of the true standard errors. Here we follow their recommended solution by estimating standard errors based on block bootstraps, where we draw 200 bootstrap samples. To see the e¤ect of this correction, we report both the conventional and block bootstrap standard errors. As expected, accounting for serial correlation generally increases the standard errors, yet the e¤ect is not large enough to change the main results.
The inclusion of GrnRate it in equation (3) is consistent with a general class of models that seek to estimate average treatment e¤ects. In such models, potential endogeneity of the treatment must be addressed. 23 The fact that we have panel data is useful in this regard; for equation
(3) will produce consistent estimates provided that GrnRate it is uncorrelated with time-varying unobservables that a¤ect electricity consumption (see Wooldridge, 2002) . While we believe this 2 2 Despite the strati…ed sample, we estimate unweighted regression models. In cases such as ours, when strati…cation is based on an explanatory variable (i.e., GrnRate), the weighting of regression models is unnecessary (see Wooldridge, 2002) .
2 3 Endogeneity of Conservi is not a concern because it is reasonable to assume that membership in an environmental organization (excluding participation in the Green Rate program) is exogenous to a household's choices pertaining to electricity consumption. assumption is reasonable, we further address potential endogeneity concerns. A plausible, though perhaps unlikely, scenario is that households foresee future reductions in their electricity demand and, therefore, are more likely to participate is the Green Rate program, as participation will be less costly. 24 To address this concern, we estimate models using subsets of the observations and compare the results with those for the Full Sample models. One speci…cation that we use is identical to equation (3), but includes only the participants and waitlisters; that is, nonparticipants are excluded from the estimation. As described previously, participants and waitlisters provide a natural experiment in which to test the e¤ect of GrnRate it , because actual participation was e¤ectively exogenous. With this subset of observations, we can identify all of the parameters with the exception of SpcHeat it , which does not apply to any household in the subset. The results of the random e¤ects estimator are reported as the Natural Experiment model in Table 3 , and the results of the …xed e¤ects estimator are reported in the Appendix. As with the Full Sample models, the Hausman test fails to reject the null hypothesis of equal coe¢ cients at any reasonable level of con…dence, and the estimated coe¢ cients are very similar between the two models.
Another model that we estimate considers only time periods prior to the Green Rate program.
This includes all observations between January 1994 and July 1996 for all three groups (participants, waitlisters, and nonparticipants). With this subset of data, we can ignore the program entirely and focus on estimating the extent of voluntary restraint, albeit over a shorter duration of time. The general form of the speci…cation is
which di¤ers from equation (3) because = = 0. The random e¤ects and …xed e¤ects estimates of equation (4) are reported as the Before Program models, in Table 3 and the Appendix, respectively. 25 2 4 One approach for dealing with such endogeneity is to use instrumental variable techniques in a dummy endogenous variable model (Heckman, 1978) , but this approach requires a good instrument for GrnRateit, which we do not have in this case.
2 5 In this case, comparisons between the random and …xed e¤ects estimators are limited because so few parameters can be identi…ed with …xed e¤ects. We nevertheless report both sets of results in the interest of completeness. 
Empirical Results
Our discussion of the results focuses on the random e¤ects models because they allow identi…cation of all parameters of interest, and they generate results that are very similar to those for the …xed e¤ects models. The Full Sample, Natural Experiment, and Before Program models are referred to hereafter as the FS, NE, and BP models, respectively.
Voluntary Restraint. Proposition 1 predicts that conservationists will consume less conventional electricity than nonconservationists. The estimate of ' in the FS model supports this prediction; it is negative and statistically signi…cant, indicating that conservationists consume less conventional electricity. The magnitude of this di¤erence is -1.591 kWh/day on average, which is a 9-percent reduction from the predicted level of average household consumption. With the FS model, therefore, we …nd evidence of substantial voluntary restraint: controlling for observed and unobserved heterogeneity, conservationists consume an average of 9 percent less conventional electricity.
The same result does not emerge in the NE model. While the estimate of ' is negative, it is not statistically di¤erent from zero. One reason for the di¤erence may be the fact that electricity demand for participants and waitlisters is very close to the threshold (of 16 kWh/day) between the …rst and second block rates, whereas this is not the case for nonparticipants (see Table 1 ). 26 In such cases-where demand is exactly at the threshold between block rates-we have shown previously that the theory does not predict di¤erences in consumption between conservationists and nonconservationists. Other possible reasons for the insigni…cance of voluntary restraint in the NE model include the facts that the number of observations is substantially lower, and that there is less variation in Conserv i when nonparticipants are excluded. For all of these reasons, we argue that the NE model does not generate the most reliable estimate of voluntary restraint.
The BP model provides a better alternative to compare with the FS model. While the panels in the BP model are limited to observations prior to July 1996, there is greater cross-sectional variation, as participants, waitlisters, and nonparticipants are all included. The estimate of ' in the BP model is -1.739, and it is statistically di¤erent from zero, suggesting again that conservationists consume less conventional electricity. The di¤erence is an average of 1.739 kWh/day, which translates into a 9.6-percent reduction from the model's predicted level of average household consumption. This result is very similar to that for the FS model and thereby provides further evidence of substantial voluntary restraint.
It is always possible that the results for voluntary restraint are subject to omitted variable bias, whereby we are missing time-invariant variables that are correlated with both Conserv i and electricty consumption. Possibilities may include spending time outdoors or watching less television.
But many other possibilities, such as living in a smaller house or having more energy e¢ cient appliances, would not a pose a problem for the analysis, as they may only re ‡ect the mechanism by which conservationists a¤ect their electricity consumption. 27
Nonconservationists. The …rst part of Proposition 2 shows that nonconservationists will participate in the Green Rate program only if they derive a su¢ ciently large lump-sum bene…t. The fact that many households without membership in an environmental organization actually participated is suggestive of this bene…t. The second part of Proposition 2 enables a more sophisticated test, however. The prediction is that participating nonconservationists will reduce their electricity consumption, and the magnitude of their reduction will be as if there had been an increase in the price of conventional electricity equal to the green-electricity premium. The estimates of test this prediction. In both the FS and NE models, the estimated coe¢ cient is negative and statistically signi…cant, indicating that participating nonconservationists do in fact reduce their electricity consumption. The average magnitude of this reduction is 0.701 and 1.541 kWh/day, or 3.9 and 9.5 percent from the predicted means, for the FS and NE models, respectively. 28
But how do these estimates for reduced electricity consumption compare to what would have occurred with only an increase in the price of conventional electricity equal to the premium of 1.58c //kWh? To answer this question, we derive price elasticities based on the voluntary premium and compare them to previously published estimates of the price elasticity for conventional electric-2 7 We did ask a survey question about square footage of the residence, but we …nd no statistically signi…cant di¤erence between conservationists and nonconservationists. When we include the variable in the regression models, it only strengthens the results, both in magnitude and statistical signi…cance. We do not include the variable in the reported models because of a relatively high degree of nonresponse (22 percent).
2 8 Recall the potential endogeneity issue regarding GrnRateit in the FS model. If this were indeed a problem, we would expect^ to overestimate the true e¤ect. The fact that^ in the NE model is even larger lends support to the argument that endogeneity in the FS model is not a concern.
ity. We calculate the elasticities using the percentage change in the average price. 29 Our estimates of the voluntary-price elasticity are -0.16 for the FS model and -0.38 for the NE model. It turns out that both estimates of the voluntary-price elasticity are well within the range of the price elasticities for conventional electricity that are reported in the literature, which generally fall between -0.1 and -0.7 (see Bohi and Zimmerman, 1984, and Berndt, 1991) . We therefore cannot reject the hypothesis that participating nonconservationists respond as if there had only been an increase in the price of conventional electricity. Recall that, in the context of the theoretical model, this result implies that participation is motivated by a lump-sum bene…t, due possibly to the social and psychological bene…ts described earlier.
Conservationists. What happens to the electricity consumption of participating conservationists? The …rst part of Proposition 3 identi…es the possibility for an increase, a decrease, or no change in electricity consumption. Here the econometric results provide evidence of no change in consumption. The average change in consumption for a participating conservationist is given by the linear combination of + in speci…cation (3). Estimates of this linear combination are -0.141 and -0.918 kWh/day for the FS and NE models, respectively. While both estimates of the linear combination are negative, neither is statistically di¤erent from zero. 30 Thus, conservationists-who were already exhibiting voluntary restraint-exhibit no statistically signi…cant change in consumption after participating in the Green Rate program. In the context of the theoretical model, this implies that the price premium for green electricity is approximately equal to the subjective externality that conservationists were voluntarily internalizing with conventional electricity. It is possible, however, that the result also re ‡ects greater inelasticity of demand for conservationists, as they are already exhibiting voluntary restraint.
Conservationists versus nonconservationists. Proposition 4 makes two predictions about the relationship between conservationists and nonconservationists. The …rst prediction is that participating conservationists will reduce their electricity consumption by (weakly) less than participating nonconservationists. This prediction is consistent with a positive coe¢ cient on the interaction term Conserv GrnRate. In both the FS and NE models, the coe¢ cient is positive and approximately equal to 0.6. While both estimates are statistically signi…cant with the conventional standard errors, accounting for potential serial correlation renders them both statistically insigni…cant.
The second prediction of Proposition 4 is that, after controlling for other factors, conservationists and nonconservationists who participate in the Green Rate program will consume the same amount of green electricity. We test this prediction with the hypothesis that ' + = 0. Estimates of this linear combination are -1.031 and 0.387 kWh/day for the FS and NE models, yet Wald tests reveal that neither estimate is statistically di¤erent from zero. Thus, the two types of households are indistinguishable with respect to green-electricity consumption. According to the theoretical model, this similarity occurs because conservationists have no reason to voluntarily restrain their consumption of green electricity, as it generates no pollution.
Other determinants of electricity consumption. The remaining coe¢ cients in Table 3 provide information about other factors that in ‡uence electricity consumption. There is evidence that electric heating a¤ects consumption in the expected way. Based on the FS and BP models, the coe¢ cient on SpcHeat is positive, indicating that, in the months when heating is required, the households with electric heat use more electricity than households without it. This e¤ect is not statistically signi…cant, however, after accounting for serial correlation. Households with higher income consume signi…cantly more electricity, and the implied income elasticities are 0.16, 0.13, and 0.13 in the FS, NE, and BP models. 31 The number of family members living in the household has a positive and signi…cant e¤ect on electricity consumption. Electricity consumption is signi…cantly lower in apartments and condominiums compared to houses; whereas, mobile homes are not signi…cantly di¤erent from houses. Home ownership does not have a signi…cant e¤ect on electricity consumption, nor do the sociodemographic characteristics of age and education. Gender does have a signi…cant e¤ect in the FS and BP models, and the positive coe¢ cient indicates that a female name on billing statements is associated with lower electricity consumption. Although not reported, the year dummies exhibit no general trend, while the month dummies indicate more electricity consumption during the winter months. This latter result is to be expected in places like Traverse City, where the number of daylight hours is substantially lower in the winter, and air conditioning is not common in the summer.
Summary and Conclusion
This paper investigates how concern for the environment translates into predictable patterns of behavior. Three questions provide the focus of analysis: Do preferences for environmental quality result in the voluntary restraint of consumption? What explains willingness to pay a premium for environmentally friendly goods and services? And what is the relationship between voluntary restraint and voluntary price premiums?
The theoretical model starts with the distinction between conservationists and nonconservationists. Only conservationists care about environmental quality in a way that promotes concern about the e¤ects of their consumption decisions on the environment. This concern-motivated perhaps by guilt alone-translates into the voluntary restraint of consumption. While voluntary restraint is conservation based on the choice of quantities, the model also considers conservation based on the choice of prices. When the opportunities are available, the desire to avoid generating pollution may translate into payment of a voluntary premium for substitute goods and services that are more environmentally friendly. These di¤erent mechanisms for voluntary conservation mirror the relationship between traditional environmental policies based on quantities or prices.
An additional feature of the model is that willingness to pay a voluntary price premium is motivated by more than just the desire to reduce pollution. Social and psychological bene…ts play a role. These bene…ts may be related to social approval, prestige, and warm glow-the same motives that have been shown to motivate private provision of public goods. For both conservationists and nonconservationists, these motives are captured with a potential lump-sum bene…t. According to the model, therefore, both conservationists and nonconservationists may be willing to pay a voluntary price premium, whereas only conservationists exhibit voluntary restraint.
The empirical portion of the paper analyzes household electricity demand before and after introduction of a green-electricity program. The analysis takes advantage of original survey data and utility data to estimate di¤erences in electricity consumption between conservationists and nonconservationists, before and after participation in the green-electricity program. The empirical setting provides a unique natural experiment in which program participants are compared to a control group of households on the program's waiting list.
The empirical results are consistent with the theoretical predictions. There is evidence of substantial voluntary restraint, as conservationists consume almost 10 percent less conventional electricity than nonconservationists. Conservationists are also more likely to participate in the green-electricity program. Other results are based on changes in electricity consumption after paying the voluntary price premium for green electricity. Nonconservationists are found to reduce their consumption after participating in the program. In particular, they reduce consumption as if there had been an increase in the price of conventional electricity equal to the premium for green electricity. In the context of the model, this result is consistent with the existence of social and psychological bene…ts of the green-electricity program that are unrelated to electricity consumption. In contrast, conservationists, who were already exhibiting voluntary restraint, do not reduce their electricity consumption after paying the price premium for green electricity. This result is consistent with the price premium for green electricity being approximately equal to the subjective externality that conservationists were voluntarily internalizing with conventional electricity. Finally, there is evidence that conservationists and nonconservationists are indistinguishable with respect to consumption of green electricity. The theory underlying this result is that voluntary restraint does not apply to environmentally friendly goods and services.
To conclude, the theoretical analysis provides new insight into the economics of voluntary conservation. Understanding behavior of this type is important, as it opens the door to consideration of the potential ways in which voluntary conservation can serve as a complement or substitute for more centralized forms of energy and environmental policy. The theoretical model generates a series of novel predictions about the relationship between voluntary restraint and voluntary price premiums. We …nd empirical support for all of the theoretical predictions. It is worth noting that the preceding analysis has been entirely positive rather than normative. While the focus has been on explaining and predicting behavior, we have not addressed the question of whether the green electricity program is socially bene…cial. Bene…ts certainly accrue to participants, and the public also bene…ts from any emission reductions. But green electricity programs, including the one studied here, are often subsidized. Whether the social bene…ts exceed the costs in green electricity programs is a question for future research. Moreover, future research should investigate whether the behavioral …ndings here are robust to consumption of di¤erent goods and services. Opportunities for such research are increasingly available, as markets for environmentally friendly goods and services continue to expand.
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